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In October 2007, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jointly re-
leased the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which aroused 
widespread attention in international military circles. The new U.S. “maritime 
strategy” focuses on future security threats. It not only puts forward some new 
concepts, but also demonstrates many aspects of future military strategic ad-
justment and the development trends of military transformation.
1. THE U.S. MILITARY’S “MARITIME STRATEGY” IS PROFOUNDLY 
INFLUENCED BY [AMERICA’S] SEA POWER TRADITION 
The United States is a country with a tradition of being a “sea power.” It can be 
said that the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly 
related to its understanding of the oceans, its comprehension of sea power, and 
[its] emphasis on maritime force development. And this tradition originates 
from the prominent American geostrategic scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan. Ma-
han’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term infl uence on the development and 
evolution of U.S. maritime strategy. This point can be seen very clearly from 
America’s modern development and historical trajectory.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maritime strategy was repeatedly 
revised, but never separated itself from Mahan’s sea power theory. In 1991, in 
order to adapt to changes in the maritime security environment, and more ef-
fectively use maritime power, the United States specially established a “naval 
strategic research group” and quickly introduced the maritime strategy white 
paper “From Sea to Land,” [thereby] revising the long-adhered-to “Maritime 
Strategy.” “Forward deployment” changed to “forward presence,” having a foot-
hold in “maritime operations” changed to “from sea to land,” [and] “indepen-
dently implementing large-scale sea warfare” changed to “support army and air 
force joint operations.”
The “9/11” terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. secu-
rity concept. National security and military strategy underwent a major adjust-
ment. The U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly. It put forward the goal 
of constructing naval forces possessing information superiority; devoted to de-
veloping forward presence, maritime capability for comprehensive superiority 
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in land assault, and information warfare; and addressing twenty-fi rst century 
maritime security threats.
This time, the introduction of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” 
can be said to be one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last twenty 
years. It not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime secu-
rity threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use mili-
tary power to meet national security objectives. This is the greatest distinction 
between the new “maritime strategy” and its predecessor.
2. THE U.S. “MARITIME STRATEGY” PUTS FORWARD NEW THINKING 
REGARDING HOW TO ADDRESS SECURITY THREATS
The most prominent feature of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” is to 
put “preventing war and winning war” in equally important positions. The pur-
suit of absolute military superiority, stressing the defeat of any opponent, has al-
ways been the core of U.S. military strategy. The objective of using military force 
to prevent war is embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence 
theory, but it is very rarely placed at the same level as winning wars in important 
strategic documents. In the new “maritime strategy,” this type of overbearing, 
offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis 
on “strategic cooperation” to jointly address future maritime security threats.
The concept of “cooperation” put forward by the new strategy refers not only 
to cooperation among the three strategic forces of the Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Coast Guard, but also to military strength and national cooperation in the 
fi elds of diplomacy, etc.; even more important is the emphasis on international 
cooperation. The new strategy stresses that the majority of the world’s popu-
lation lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of 
world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a 
direct bearing on the American people’s way of life. Faced with the increasingly 
serious maritime threats, “no country [in the world] has adequate resources 
or forces to ensure the security of the entire maritime area,” no single country 
has the ability to deal with international terrorism single-handedly. Therefore, 
international “strategic cooperation” is an important way to achieve maritime 
security. Likewise, developments in globalization and informatization* will 
also propel the evolution of naval strategies.
*  Chinese sources use the term “informatization” [信息化] to describe the utilization of information 
technology, networks, and even command automation to improve military performance. For 
details on the role of “informatization” in transforming China’s navy, see Andrew Erickson and 
Michael Chase, “Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
50, no. 3 (2008), pp. 24–30; and “PLA Navy Modernization: Preparing for ‘Informatized’ War at 
Sea,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 8, no. 5 (29 February 2008), pp. 2–5, available at www
.jamestown.org. 
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To implement the new “maritime strategy,” the U.S. military proposed huge 
programs to develop a “thousand-ship Navy,” [and] build “Global Fleet Sta-
tions.” The purpose for developing the “thousand-ship Navy” is to strengthen 
allied naval cooperation and communication, through joint maritime opera-
tions involving each nation, and deal with the increasingly complex maritime 
security environment. By building “Global Fleet Stations,” naval forces will pro-
vide global protection. To achieve this goal, the U.S. military has already begun 
to deploy new “Fleet Stations” in world focal point regions. This new concept 
advanced in the strategic documents of the U.S. military can only be regarded as 
a major transformation in its understanding of the application of military force 
in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist 
and preemptive strategy.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the im-
portance of “international cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hege-
monic mentality. Regarding core national interests at sea, such as the right to 
freedom of action at sea, sea lane control, and deploying forces in important 
strategic regions, the new strategy and the three sea power principles put for-
ward by Mahan of maritime military strength, overseas military bases, and sea 
line control are exactly the same; it can [therefore] be said that the U.S. “mari-
time strategy” has the same spirit.
3. THE “MARITIME STRATEGY” INDICATES SOME CHANGES IN THE 
NATURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY’S FUTURE EVOLUTION
The U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” was deliberated for two years be-
fore being issued. This period coincided with a time during which the United 
States was bogged down in a quagmire in the war in Iraq and intense confl icts 
were breaking out between the ruling and opposition parties. Within the Bush 
administration, the neoconservatives fell into disgrace, and a number of indi-
viduals at the helm of the Defense Department such as [Donald] Rumsfeld and 
[Paul] Wolfowitz left one after the other. Regarding such major issues as the Iraq 
War, military transformation, and future military development, many people 
have undergone [a transition to] new thinking. Although the new “maritime 
strategy” is not the result of systematic refl ection, in many ways it has already 
revealed these development trends.
. . .美国能够成为世界霸权国家与其 . . .对海上力量发展的重视有直接关系. . . . 
马汉的“海权” 思想对美国海上战略的发展演变产生了长远的影响.
The ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . emphasis 
on maritime force development. . . . Mahan’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term infl uence on the 
development and evolution of U.S. maritime strategy.
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The new “maritime strategy” indicates a transformation in U.S. thinking 
concerning the use of military force. As the only superpower in the world today, 
on the basis of comprehensive national strength, the United States obviously 
enjoys a superior status. No one doubts U.S. hard power, especially its power-
ful military strength. However, since “9/11,” the United States has pursued a 
unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve 
all security problems, not only damaging its hard power, but also seriously set-
ting back its soft power. Damage to hard power can possibly be recovered from 
in a relatively short period, but damage to soft power requires not only a long 
period of great exertion but also policy changes. Since 2007, around the issue 
of the use of soft power, the U.S. academic community carried out an unprece-
dented great discussion. The renowned U.S. think tank “Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS)” held special seminars [in which] former major 
government offi cials and expert scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard 
Armitage, [and] Joseph Nye proposed that in order for the U.S. government to 
extend its hegemonic rule the United States must attach great importance to the 
coordinated use of hard and soft power. [They] proposed to use hard and soft 
power in coordination as “rational strength” [smart power] in order to realize 
strategic national security goals. This is the context in which the U.S. military’s 
new “maritime strategy” was introduced; and many of its proposals refl ect this 
new way of thinking about achieving national security objectives and safeguard-
ing national strategic interests. 
The new “maritime strategy” refl ects tentative rethinking of the Iraq War. 
As the Iraq War enters its fi fth year, the United States has already expended the 
high cost of nearly four thousand human lives and fi ve hundred billion U.S. 
dollars. Because the war is still continuing, it is diffi cult to predict its future de-
velopment. The U.S. military still cannot, and does not, have a systematic sum-
mation of conditions in progress, but the U.S. intellectual elite is in the process 
of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact 
on policy-making departments. At the beginning of the Iraq War, in the face of 
universal opposition from the international community, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld advanced the unyielding position that “it is not the coalition 
that determines the mission, but the mission that determines the coalition.” 
Through the passage of time and events, today the U.S. military’s “maritime 
strategy” has already taken “international cooperation” as an important prin-
ciple. This contrast indicates that the United States security and military strat-
egy will face a major new adjustment. The U.S. presidential election has already 
begun, and “change” has already become a demand of mainstream American 
society. Regardless of whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party 
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comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign pol-
icy are inevitable.
The new “maritime strategy” indicates that future U.S. military transforma-
tion will have new changes. U.S. military transformation issues were already 
mentioned as early as during the Clinton administration, but really started in a 
comprehensive manner after Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon. To promote trans-
formation, Rumsfeld put forward a series of radical measures, causing enor-
mous controversy at the high levels of the U.S. military. The war in Iraq, in fact, 
became a testing ground for U.S. military transformation. Rumsfeld advanced 
restructuring measures, such as large-scale reduction of the army, the reduction 
of large-scale combat platforms, and adjustment of the structure and composi-
tion of troops, etc.; many of which were overturned in the course of the Iraq 
War. The newly appointed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral [Mi-
chael] Mullen is not only the new strategy’s planner and organizer, but also has 
maintained independent thinking as one of the senior high ranking military 
offi cers. As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral] Mullen repeatedly suggested 
that “the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime 
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only 
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other 
countries to maintain freedom of passage.” It is precisely through his promotion 
that the new “maritime strategy” was introduced.
Without any doubt, the U.S. Navy chose the timing of the promulgation of 
the new “maritime strategy” to promote its own interests. Military spending 
has always been the focus of competition among the armed services. For the 
maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they 
must lead strategic thinking and initiatives. Six years after the “9/11” incident, it 
is diffi cult to convince people that emphasizing naval development is important 
to combat international terrorism. Precisely because of this, some people and 
military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a 
“Chinese naval threat theory” or “Russian maritime threat” argument.
Because of its wide-ranging mobility, the Navy is known as the “international 
service.” This distinguishing feature of maritime forces gives them the advan-
tage of viewing the world from a global perspective. In a period of relative peace 
and stability, how to employ maritime forces to safeguard national security is the 
common task facing each nation’s naval construction. Because the United States 
is a country that places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy 
作为世界军事变革的领头羊, 美国海上战略变化值得关注.
As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits 
close scrutiny.
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can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguard-
ing the world maritime order. As a bellwether of world military transformation, 
[therefore], U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits close scrutiny.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E
This article was originally published in Study Times, 22 January 2008, www.lianghui.org.cn.
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